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When silence means acceptance: understanding the right to 
silence as a linguistic phenomenoni. 
Georgina Heydon 
Alternative Law Journal, accepted manuscript 
Introduction 
The suspect’s right to silence during a police interview, and the debate about the 
confidentiality of the suspect’s choice to exercise that right, have thus far been considered 
primarily a civil rights concern best addressed by the legal fraternity.  Scholarly articles 
and newspaper editorials and opinion pieces have considered the controversy from a 
number of angles – moral, ethical, legal – but none, to my knowledge, have considered 
the linguistic implications of a ‘right to silence’.   
This article has emerged from my ongoing research into the discursive behaviour of 
participants in police interviews with suspectsii, which is based on the analysis of data 
from police-suspect interviews tape-recorded in Victoria, Australia.  The article presents 
an analysis of language data drawn from those police interviews recorded, with the 
intention of providing an introduction for non-linguists to the use of linguistic analysis in 
a legal setting.   
Crucially, the analysis of police interview data demonstrates that people expect a 
vigorous denial when someone is accused of something, and that the ‘conversational 
rules’ that generate this expectation will apply regardless of the speech context.  As a 
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result, a person who exercises their right to silence will be seen as ‘failing to deny’, and 
so to be accepting the allegations against them.   
Conversation Analysis (CA) 
Naturally occurring conversations provide a rich source of data for the branch of 
linguistics known as Conversation Analysis (hereafter CA).  The analysis of the data in 
this study draws on tools used within the framework of CA as it was originally proposed 
nearly forty years ago by the late sociologist Harvey Sacks, and subsequently developed 
by his colleagues Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff.   
While a police interview may seem far from natural it is in fact a perfect example of 
institutional discourse, recorded in its natural or intended setting without any influence 
from the researcher.  For this reason we are able to analyse segments of the interviews in 
order to identify those conversational ‘rules’ which are observed by the participants as 
they construct the discourse.   
As we are dealing with police interview data, it is important to recognise that such talk is 
conducted within certain organizationally-determined parameters, especially the pre-
allocation of the police authoritative ‘voice’.  However, the literature has clearly 
established that these parameters are themselves identifiable as conversational rules, and 
Conversation Analytic methods have been fruitfully applied to a wide range institutional 
talk to reveal precisely how the rules of ordinary conversation are applied or adapted to 
produce the very characteristics of an institutional interviewiii.  
One of the conversational rules which forms the focus of the present study, and which 
will be discussed in detail below, governs the use of what are known in CA as ‘preferred 
responses’.  It may be surprising for those unfamiliar with language analysis to find that 
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participants in an interaction rigidly adhere to rules of any kind, but in fact there are well-
established rules that govern who can speak next and the type of contribution that can be 
offered in response to an initial turn at talk.iv These rules can be broken, but they cannot 
be ignored, by which I mean that it will be noticeable to the participants when a rule has 
been broken and some redress will often be required.    
When a question remains unanswered or a person speaks out of turn, any competent 
participant in the conversation will know that a rule of conversation has been broken.  In 
fact, our language is replete with phrases and terminology for just such occasions: ‘I 
hadn’t finished’, ‘wait your turn’ ‘don’t butt in’ ‘sorry to interrupt’, and perhaps a cliché 
of the media interviewer, ‘Minister, you haven’t answered the question!’.  The careful 
scrutiny of these and other less obvious rules provides a unique perspective, and offers a 
micro-level, linguistic response to a macro-level, legal question.   
Legislative background 
In the state of Victoria, linguistic considerations of interview procedure arise from the 
Crimes Act (1958), and the police Standing Orders which are derived in part from the 
Crimes Actv.  For instance, a useful insight into the nature of ‘voluntariness’ in a police 
interview is provided by s464A (3) of the Crimes Act (1958) and s8.5 of the Standing 
Orders.  The Crimes Act states that before any questioning commences, a suspect must be 
told “that he or she does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does 
say or do may be given in evidence”; the Standing orders state that a confession is 
defined as ‘voluntary, not in the sense that it is made spontaneously or that it was 
volunteered, but in the sense that it was made in the exercise of a free choice to speak or 
be silent.’  Thus we can see that the use of a caution by police officers to advise suspects 
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of their right to remain silent is a step which is intended in itself to render any subsequent 
confession or admission voluntary.   
However, subsequent sections of the police Standing Orders recognise that a confession 
which follows a caution is not voluntary as a matter of course, and police officers are 
instructed to avoid certain strategies which may jeopardize the voluntariness of any 
confession or admission.   For instance s8.8(a) prohibits interviewing officers from taking 
any action which may ‘endeavour to force any such person [i.e. a suspect] into making 
any admission of guilt’, s8.8(g) states that ‘where such person makes a confession [an 
interviewing officer shall not] attempt, by further questioning, to break down answers 
(sic) to which unfavourable replies have been received’vi. In other words, although a 
confession may have been offered which is deemed voluntary by virtue of having been 
made by a suspect who is aware of his or her right to remain silent, the approach taken by 
the police officers in the elicitation of such a confession may still render the confession 
involuntary.  Both the legislation and the Standing Orders recognize that, for suspects 
faced with coercive police behaviour in an interview, merely knowing that they can 
remain silent is not considered sufficient protection against forced confessions. 
Preference in Conversation Analysis 
One of the key structural features of conversation identified by Sacks and his colleagues 
is that almost all the speakers’ contributions, or ‘turns’ as they are called in CA, come in 
pairs: an initiation turn (e.g. a question or an invitation) and a response turn (e.g. an 
answer or an acceptance/rejection).  In CA, such pairings are referred to as ‘adjacency 
pairs’ because they are bound to each other in an adjacent position in the conversation.  
 5 
The initiation turn is referred to as the ‘first pair part’ and the response turn is referred to 
as the ‘second pair part’, even when the second part of the adjacency pair does not 
immediately follow the first.  Within this conversation structure the phenomenon of 
‘preference’ arises. 
In CA the term ‘preference’ is used as a technical notion, not in its everyday sense;vii CA 
provides a set of conversational rules which are ‘conventional reference points that actors 
orient to and that give behaviour its particular intelligibility’, and ‘by which actors 
understand one another’s behaviour’viii .  Participants in an interaction can draw 
inferences based on these conventional reference points; this is fundamental to the 
concept of ‘preference’ in CA.  
The technical notion of preference is that, following an utterance which is a first pair part 
of an adjacent pair (eg an invitations, request, accusation etc), certain responses, or 
second pair parts, are ‘preferred’ over others by virtue of the fact that if there is no 
response, those ‘preferred’ responses will be noticeably absent.  For example, following 
an invitation it is possible for the recipient to accept or reject the invitation.  However, if 
the recipient remains silent, or otherwise fails to offer either an acceptance or a rejection, 
it is the acceptance which is lacking, and a rejection is assumed to have been offered in 
its absence.  Consider the following exchange: 
John Do you want to see a movie with me next Friday? First pair part 
(invitation) 
Jane …er… Second pair part 
(non-response filler) 
John Well, maybe Saturday? First pair part 
(invitation) 
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Jane’s non-response is interpreted by John as a rejection, since an acceptance was not 
offered, and John offers a modified invitation next on the basis of this interpretation.  
Although this is an invented conversation, any competent speaker of the language would 
accept as reasonable the way in which John uses the rules of preference to make 
inferences about Jane’s second pair part – his modified invitation does not come as any 
great surprise. 
Of interest here is Bilmes’ discussion of a particular case of preference which concerns 
accusations.  Bilmes agrees that following accusations, denials are preferred,ix and says: 
‘[i]f one fails to deny an accusation, a denial is noticeably absent and is a cause for 
inference, the most common inference being that the accusation is true’x . 
Bilmes goes on to demonstrate that in fact this preference for denials following 
accusations is part of a broader type of preference – ‘when A attributes some action or 
thought or attitude to B, in B’s presence, there is a preference for B to contradict A 
interruptively or immediately following the turn in which the attribution was 
produced...When such attribution occurs without contradiction, a contradiction is 
relevantly absent’xi .  Bilmes demonstrates the strength of this argument using a number 
of examples of both contradicted and non-contradicted attributionsxii. 
Some general features of police interview interactions 
The use of language by speakers in police interviews contributes to the construction of 
the interview as a ‘chain’ of adjacency pairs, most of which can be loosely classified as 
question and answer (Q-A) pairs.  This does not mean simply that the discourse consists 
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of interviewers asking questions to which interviewees offer answers, which would seem 
rather an obvious feature of an interview.  Rather, it describes the specific conversational 
rules that are applied by participants to ensure that this is the only structure which is 
allowed in the interview.  Thus, suspect-initiated utterances are produced only within 
exchanges or turn types that facilitate the return of the floor to the police participant at 
their conclusion.  For example, if a suspect initiates a question, it is always a clarification 
question, which, together with the police clarification response, is inserted between a 
prior police question and a subsequent suspect answer such that there is no disruption to 
the overall chain of Q-A adjacency pairs.  There is an inflexible ‘chain rule’xiii governing 
turn allocation which operates in police interviews, so that recurring sets of adjacency 
pairs oblige the suspect to respond to first-pair parts, such as questions, and return control 
of the interview the police interviewer.  
If we consider the institutional requirements which produce the interview turn structure, 
we see that it is the role of the police officer as ‘elicitor’ which is crucial in establishing 
the recurring chain rule.  This is made clear in the allocation of ‘topic management 
strategies’.   
One of the results of the chain rule is that the role of interviewer affords the police officer 
a far greater range of topic initiation devices than it does the interviewee.  Whereas the 
interviewee is only able to introduce new topics in ways which do not oblige the police 
interviewer to take up a respondent role, an interviewer can introduce a new topic within 
any first pair part.  The suspect is constrained to topic initiations which are minimally 
obligating and can be easily ignored, while the police interviewer is able to introduce new 
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topics within highly obligating adjacency pair structures.  For instance, the interviewer is 
able to ask questions which oblige the interviewee to produce a topically-relevant answer, 
even if the interviewee’s previous turn related to a completely different topic.  The 
following extract demonstrates this: 
Extract 1xiv 
380.  Police: do you know why she would have gone out the back room? 
381.   li’ would she have been scared or 
382.  Suspect: maybe she was? 
383.   but m’ Betty’s never ev seen me like that 
384.   I’ve never been like that before 
385.   Betty knows I would not hurt her or hurt anyone 
386.   and she must have known something really sparked him off 
387.   to get me goin like that  
388.   something had to be goin 
389.   something had to 
390.  Police: w’l what happened then? 
391.  Suspect: get me going to do something like that 
392.  Police: you’ve hit him a coupla times 
393.   he’s um  holding his mouth or bleeding 
The effort made by the suspect to complete his turn in line 391, when he has been 
interrupted by a topically disjunctive question put to him by the police interviewer, is 
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subsequently ignored by interviewer.  This underlines the weakness of the obligation on 
the police interviewer to take up new information provided by the suspect despite the 
overt display by the suspect that he considers the information important.   
The application of a Q-A chain rule in interviews provides police officers with recurrent 
ability to produce highly obligating topic initiation devices in any sequential position. 
The structure of the turn-taking mechanism ensures that police interviewers are endowed 
with an authoritative voice by virtue of their institutional role, while suspects are heavily 
constrained in their allowable contributions.  We need to recognize that such an 
authoritative voice can provide the means by which a police officer may use 
inappropriate pressure to elicit a confession or admission.  
Accusations and attributions 
Accusations and attributions are a vital resource for police interviewers who are trying to 
establish a police version of events as they present the police narrative in a form that 
obligates the suspect to respond.  The following data illustrate how accusations and 
attributions are produced and responded to in police interviews.  Denials usually occur 
‘interruptively or immediately following the turn in which the attribution was produced’ 
(emphasis added) ,xv and in the analysis of these extracts it will become clear that the 
timing of the accusation is critical to its effectiveness. 
In Extract 2 the suspect interrupts the police interviewer in line 316 to deny the allegation 
made against him:   
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Extract 2 
314.  Police: he states that it was a closed fist  
315.   that you punched him in the mouth 
316.  Suspect: nah caw 
Extract 3 demonstrates again that denials are placed interruptively by the respondent; in 
lines 334 and 337, the suspect interrupts the interviewer to deny the accusation made in 
line 333: 
Extract 3 
333.  Police: it’s also alleged that there was actually three hits  
334.  Suspect: no 
335.  Police: two punches 
336.   and then a backhander before you left 
337.  Suspect: w’l 
338.   w’l I tell y what if I gave out three 
339.   they must have been quick 
Extract 4, a different case, provides a contrasting example: the suspect does not directly 
deny the accusation, implicit in the interviewer’s utterance in line 159, that the suspect 
‘forcibly dragged’ his girlfriend out of the house:  
Extract 4 
159.  Police: so aaaah what didju didju forcibly drag ‘er outta the house? 
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160.  Suspect: like I said look I  
161.   aw well it was more o’ less you know arguin an’ pushin’ n’ pullin’ n  
162.   yeahn’whe’ 
163.   I grabbed’a by the bag a-  
164.   no that was outside I grabbed’a by the by ‘er handbag 
165.   she had ‘er handbag over ‘er shoulder 
166.   cos we were going 
167.   and then I d’n know what happened 
168.   shemust have gone to take off or someth’ like that 
169.   grabbed her by the handbag 
170.   And I remember ‘er handbag got ripped to shreds 
This is particularly interesting because a little later, in line 181, the interviewer indicates 
that he has heard a lack of a denial by the suspect as agreement, describing the action as 
still draggin’ ‘er : 
Extract 5 
181.  Police were you ah still draggin’ ‘er at this stage? 
By failing to immediately and directly deny the accusation made in Extract 4, the suspect 
leaves open the possibility that he has accepted the accusation, even though a denial is 
made later in the data (Extract 7 below). 
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Similarly in line 184 and following, the interviewer makes an accusation that the suspect 
has dragged his girlfriend by the hair.  The suspect does not expressly deny this in his 
immediately following turn but says it happened at a different time: 
Extract 6 
184.  Police right it’s it’s alleged that at that stage 
185.   that it was er thatcha had hold of ‘er hair 
186.   dragged her out by the hair waddeyer say to that? 
187.  Suspect (that was after she went back into the house  
Later, in lines 193-197, the suspect explains that he did not drag the victim outside by the 
hair, but rather that he had hold of her hair as she was sitting inside and tried to pull her 
to her feet: 
Extract 7 
192.  Police: she went back inside what happened then 
193.  Suspect: yep yeah that’s when I dragged her 
194.   I didn’t drag her kinda by the hair outta th’ house 
195.   I she was kinda kneeling in front of the TV  
196.   and I just went in there and grabbed ‘er by th’ hair n’ 
197.   kinda tried to lift ‘er up and yeah 
198.  Police: w’ would you agree that 
199.   thas not the normal way that anyone would ah  
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200.   assist someone up onto their feet by pick’n them up by the hair 
201.  Suspect: not really 
202.  Police: right and ah what happened then 
203.   After you’ve dragged ‘er up by the hair 
204.  Suspect: well eventually we’ve got in the car an) left 
Clearly, a denial made at a time removed from the accusation does not have much 
impact.  It is apparent that the police officer is inferring from this lack of an adjacent 
denial that the suspect accepts the accusation: he restates that supposition in line 203.  In 
line 243 of Extract 8 below, the interviewer again says ‘dragging her outside’, despite the 
fact that the suspect has never directly admitted that he undertook this action, and has 
offered various forms of denial: 
Extract 8 
239.  Police: ahm it’s ah she’s had some injuries on ‘er arm  
240.   bruising to both  biceps 
241.  Suspect: mm hm 
242.  Police: at some stage (didju have hold of ‘er other bicep  
243.   dragging her outside 
Returning to the first case (extracts 1-3) a final extract comes closest to containing a zero 
response after an attribution: 
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Extract 9 
433.  Police: uh you saw the glass shatter to the ground 
434.  Suspect: I just kept walking 
435.   I just got in the car  
436.   and Rob me friend said what the hell’s going on 
437.   whadcha do 
438.  Police: so you didn’t bother saying anything to them 
439.   that the glass was broken or 
In response to the interviewer’s attribution of seeing the glass shatter, the suspect claims 
that he just kept walking. This is not an overt contradiction or acceptance of the 
attribution; he may have seen the glass shatter before he kept walking, or he may not 
have.  The suspect seems to be making an entirely different point to that which the 
interviewer is pursuing in lines 438-9.  Regardless of the point the suspect may have been 
making, the interviewer has assumed that the suspect accepts the attribution of seeing the 
glass shatter and of being aware that it has shattered.  There is evidence in this extract, as 
well as in Extracts 4-8, that a suspect’s lack of a contradiction immediately following an 
attribution, is treated as an implicit acceptance by the suspect of that attribution.  
This analysis supports Bilmes’ findings that denials are routinely treated as ‘preferred’ by 
interviewers and, importantly, that the timing and placement of the denial is key to its 
recognition in the interview.  This raises a number of concerns about the practicality of 
invoking of one’s right to silence – concerns that a traditional legal analysis may not 
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identify because they are apparent only from the micro-level management of 
conversation. 
The implications of ‘preference’ for right to silence 
We have seen that the police interview provides a constrained speaking environment for 
suspects that leaves them vulnerable to acts of discursive coercion by interviewing 
officers.  We are aware that this vulnerability is addressed in part by legislation requiring 
all suspects to be informed that they have the choice to remain silent at any time.  
However, the CA notion of ‘preference’ informs us that when a suspect actually invokes 
their right to silence in response to an accusation or attribution made by police 
interviewers,  no denial or contradiction will be inferred, and ‘[g]enerally, the conclusion 
drawn is that the [suspect] is acknowledging the truth of the attribution [or 
accusation]’xvi. 
The implications are extremely serious.  If the suspect decides not to respond to an 
accusation or attribution made by an interviewing officer, it may prove difficult for the 
suspect to later address any further assertions that the interviewer makes on the basis of 
inferences drawn from the suspect’s ‘absent denial’.  Clearly this will be exacerbated if 
the suspect wishes to continue to invoke his or her right to silence.   
A complicating factor is the suspect’s lack of access to turn types in the Q-A chain – such 
as topic initiations, questions and other first pair parts – which may be needed to address 
police interviewer assumptions.  Suspects, because of their role as ‘respondent’, may 
never feel able to take up a ‘leading’ role in the conversation in order to backtrack and 
 16 
address a police assumption made some time previously in the interview.  It is common 
enough in ordinary conversation for participants to simply ‘let it go’ when some prior 
comment has been misinterpreted – how much more likely that a suspect will avoid the 
difficult and confronting task of stopping the interview to take up a conversational role 
that is not allocated to them, and dispute a police interpretation of some earlier response, 
or, worse still, lack of response?  This is of course assuming that the suspect is even 
aware of the conversational rules of preference that have led to the misinterpretation. 
If, in a subsequent trial, the defendant were known to have invoked his/her right to 
silence at any time during the police interview, a judge or jury would be able to draw the 
same inferences of ‘absent denial’ and acknowledgement of truth from the defendant’s 
silence in the interview. In other words, a judge or jury, on hearing that the defendant had 
offered no response to a particular police accusation or attribution, could unconsciously 
apply the rules of preference and infer that the defendant had agreed with the police 
utterance.   
The possibility of a court drawing an adverse inference from a suspect’s refusal to 
respond to police questions has continued to be a cause for concern articulated by the 
legal fraternity.xvii While they consider the legal arguments surrounding the issue, this 
research makes it clear that there are, as well, important linguistic considerations 
operating at a level often undetectable to a non-linguist. 
It is hoped that these linguistic considerations will enhance the legal understanding of 
silence as a response to questions, and contribute usefully to the current debate over the 
right to silence in police interviews. 
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